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Hello
Dolly, Hello Dolly: Human Cloning, Ethics and Identity
By Rebecca Wynn
Comments about this paper can be sent to: rebeccawynn@hotmail.com
Introduction
On the 23 February 1997, the world woke up to news of a new
technological advance, an advance that, according to Lee Sliver,
a Princeton geneticist, "shook the foundations of biology
and philosophy" (1). This advance was embodied in a "little
lamb" going by the name of Dolly. That morning, Dolly the
sheep became a media sensation. She was the lead story on
every television and radio broadcast and graced the front
page of every newspaper around the world. Yet at first glance,
one could be forgiven for wondering what was so special about
this white faced sheep. For all the world, Dolly looked like
hundreds of the other lambs that dot the hills and fields
of Scotland; and indeed for six months this lamb had grazed
quietly and unnoticed among them. Compared to many of the
freakish sights that science had previously greeted us with
(2), Dolly appeared positively ordinary. However, Dolly, despite
appearances, had had a most unusual conception. She was not
the end result of a fusion of sperm with egg, but had been
cloned from a single cell taken from the breast tissue of
an adult sheep.
It would be an understatement to say that the news that Dolly
was genetically identical to her mother was not well received.
Pence's observation, "It took about a second for the questions
to begin. And another for the condemnations" (3) seems closer
to the mark. Dolly was dubbed by bioethicists, theologians,
journalists and even scientists alike as a wolf in sheep's
clothing. The metaphor had come alive! Of course it was not
Dolly per se that had triggered this blanket disapproval,
the pundits were not concerned about sheep but about people.
It was the idea that this technology could be applied to humans,
"that humans could be cloned in a manner akin to taking cuttings
from a plant" that had stirred their fear and their imagination.
Within hours of Dolly's announcement, eminent politicians
and policy-makers were lining up to jump on the anti-cloning
bandwagon. President Clinton rushed to ban federal funding
of cloning research and urged private biological firms to
do the same. The day after Dolly's announcement, he jolted
his recently appointed National Bioethics Commission into
action. The cloning of Dolly, he told them "raises serious
ethical questions, particularly with respect to the possible
use of this technology to clone human embryos." Here in Britain,
our government duly rewarded Ian Wilmut, the scientist responsible
for creating Dolly, with the withdrawal of all further funds
for his research. Theologians delivered a similar anti-cloning
message. Religious groups across the world, echoed the comments
of Nancy Duff at the Princeton Theological Seminary, "Many
people wonder if this is a miracle for which we can thank
God for or an ominous way of playing God ourselves", while
the Vatican pronounced cloning as "contrary to the moral law"
as it stood "in opposition to the dignity both of human procreation
and the conjugal union." The opposition from the public too
was startlingly impressive; a Time/CNN poll conducted a few
days after the announcement found that 93% of Americans disapproved
of cloning humans. Others however, simply cashed in. Seizing
the day, Canon (the company that makes photocopiers) produced
an advertisement featuring two identical sheep, "Big deal"
the advertisement read, " We've been making perfect copies
for years". (4)
Despite the seemingly unanimous consensus, some commentators
have slipped through the woodwork that are not afraid of human
cloning. One of these is Gregory Pence, he believes that "These
knee-jerk condemnations stem from fear and ignorance; they
should not be mistaken for moral wisdom". (5) Our conception
of what a clone is, Pence feels is fuelled by a diet of science
fiction; science fiction however, that has very little in
common with the science fact. I think Pence makes a valid
point. We are tainted by the films such as the "Invasion of
the Body Snatchers", which "teaches" us that clones will emerge
fully-grown from their pods or womb tanks, growing from zygotes
to adult size in a few days. As well as, "The Boys from Brazil",
in which an evil scientist clones multiple copies of Adolph
Hitler. The presumption behind this film is that a person's
clones will have identical personalities and beliefs to him.
If people realised that real clones were not like their fictional
counterparts, perhaps they would not deem cloning ethically
unacceptable. John Harris is another commentator who seems
to be losing little sleep over the prospect of human clones.
He is more concerned with the lack of substantive discussion
of the issue. He states, "The ethical implications of human
clones have been much alluded to but seldom have been examined
with any rigor". In a review of the official responses to
human cloning by authorities such as, the World Health Organisation,
the European Parliament and UNESCO, he finds their statements
"thin on argument and rationale; they appear to have been
plucked from the air to justify an instant reaction. There
are vague references to "human rights" or "basic principles"
with little or no attempt to explain what these principles
are, or to indicate how they might apply to cloning" (6).
The aim of this essay is to examine the issue of human cloning
with the "rigor" John Harris feels is lacking from many of
the other discussions of the topic. It will attempt to dispel
the cloning myths and set the discussion in its actual context.
One of my main objectives will be dispel what I regard to
be the predominant cloning myth, the idea that my clone will
be identical to me in beliefs and personality. This section
will approach the myth by discussing the idea that cloning
might provide a way to bring relatives back from the dead
or enable a person to live forever. After this section, the
dissertation will review many of the arguments against human
cloning. The particular arguments I will be focusing on will
include, the contention that cloning ought to be prohibited
because the majority feels that it ought to, and the idea
that human cloning is an affront to human dignity. The section
on human dignity will explore what human dignity actually
is and then sketch out the ways in which the opponents of
human cloning have seen cloning as infringing human dignity.
The opponents of cloning have suggested that human cloning
will result in instrumentalisation, or using people as a means
rather than treating them as an end. They have also suggested
that cloning transgresses human rights, for example, the right
to two parents and the right to a unique genetic identity.
I shall also briefly touch on the idea that cloning is unnatural
and so morally unacceptable.
Unfortunately due to the confines of space I have had to jettison
the discussion of some arguments against cloning. One argument
I have excluded is the idea that cloning is wrong because
it is against God's Will. The reason I decided to forego discussion
of this issue is that I feel that it has less impact than
other arguments against cloning in our secular age. Moreover,
I feel that a person who wants to take this stance has some
heavyweight questions to answer before his objection can even
get off the ground. These would include "how do you know that
God exists or what his will is regarding human cloning?" and
"Why do you believe that we ought to obey him?" In addition
I have had to exclude arguments against cloning humans on
safety grounds. I have decided to do this because, although
safety issues have a significant impact on whether cloning
is ethically acceptable or not, they are unlikely to be illuminated
by philosophical discussion (7).Whether human cloning is unsafe
or not, is a question for science. Moreover, the safety of
cloning is likely to be improved by further research. My contention
in this dissertation is that cloning (once proven safe by
scientific research) is ethically acceptable. Although specific
applications of cloning might be regarded as ethically dubious,
cloning per se is not.
What is Cloning?
The word clone first appeared in the language of science at
the beginning of the 20th century to describe "groups of plants
that are propagated by the use of any form of vegetative parts"
(8). Since then cloning has been used to describe the process
by which a cell or group of cells, from one individual organism
is used to derive an entirely new organism. The defining characteristic
of a clone is that it is genetically identical to its parent
cell or organism.
There are two distinct techniques that have been used to clone
animals and could therefore in theory, be used to clone humans.
The two techniques are nuclear somatic transfer or nuclear
transplantation and cell mass division or embryo splitting.
The first method, nuclear transplantation, was used to clone
Dolly. This process involves deleting the nucleus (or the
genetic material) of an egg cell and replacing it with a nucleus
(the genetic material) of another cell. This cell could be
either an embryonic, a fetal or adult cell. The egg is then
placed between two electrodes and a direct electric current
is passed through it. This breaks down the membrane separating
the nucleus from the rest of the egg and allows the contents
to fuse together. The egg is then transferred to the womb
of a surrogate mother and develops in the normal way. Dolly
was the first viable offspring produced from an adult mammalian
cell. In her case, an udder cell (9) was used, theoretically
though, any cell from any part of the body could be used to
produce a clone. The nuclear genes of clones produced by this
method will be identical, although the mitochondrial DNA of
such clones would differ. We inherit mitochondrial DNA from
our mother's egg. In cloning, the egg cell that has had its
nucleus removed, to make way for the nucleus of the other
cell, has not had its mitochondria removed. As a result the
clone is not a perfect genetic copy of the original. The mitochondrial
DNA can change over many years because of aging cells and
environmental effects. Thus, even you are female, and carrying
a clone of yourself, the clone is unlikely to inherit exactly
the same mitochondrial DNA as you. Cell mass division is the
artificial division of a single embryo. This technique replicates
the natural process that can give rise to twins. This is done
by separating embryonic cells at a very early stage of development
before they have had a chance to differentiate. The clones
produced using this technique will have both identical nuclear
and mitochondrial genes. This technique has been used extensively
in animals and has recently been used as a way of multiplying
human embryos. In October 1993, at the George Washington Medical
Centre, Jerry Hall and Robert Stillman cloned human embryos
by splitting early two- to eight-cell embryos into single
embryo cells (10). Again, if the embryo is to be brought to
term it must be carried in a woman's womb for the full period
of gestation. The essential difference between nuclear transplantation
and embryo splitting is that while both techniques produce
multiples, only nuclear transplantation has the potential
to create a clone of an adult organism.
In addition, there is a potential application of nuclear transplantation
technology that does not involve the creation of genetically
identical individuals. This has been dubbed tissue regeneration.
This technology would again involve merging a cell's nucleus
with an egg. The egg would be allowed to divide and develop;
however it would not be permitted to divide more than a few
times. The next step would to be to bathe the cells in a protein
that would direct these cells to differentiate into, for example,
marrow cells or skin cells. People have envisaged this technique
being used for the treatment of leukemia. Today the treatment
of leukemia involves the destruction of the patient's bone
marrow through chemotherapy and the transplantation of healthy
marrow cells taken from a closely matched donor. The chances
of finding a matching donor is less than 1 in 20,000 – or
one in million if your genotype is especially rare (11). Many
people die because they cannot find appropriate donors. If
we used this technique however, we could create healthy marrow
cells that are the perfect genetic match, from patients' own
cells. Doctors could take a skin cell from the patient and
then use the nuclear transplantation technique to create new
marrow cells.
Misconceptions: Cloning, Identity and Immortality
Shortly after Dolly the Sheep was cloned, the Guardian ran
an article featuring a man who claimed that cloning might
be able to provide a route to immortality. His opinion was
that since in cloning, the genetic blueprint of one individual
is used to make another individual with the same genetic make-up,
the new individual will be an exact copy of the original;
and an exact copy is as good as the original (12). The suggestion
is that we can bring back the dead by cloning them; all we
need is a few cells removed from the body before death. These
cells will enable us to make an exact copy of the dead person,
which if the man featured in the article is to be believed,
is equivalent to resurrecting them. If the process is continued
time after time, the "dead" person will have achieved immortality.
The man featured in the article is by no means exceptional
for holding this view. The belief that we can bring back the
dead by cloning them was the motivation behind a request sent
to the Roslin Institute by a woman who wanted a copy of her
father. Her father was approaching death, and she felt that
if Wilmut could produce a clone of him, she could prevent
his death (13). This belief also fuelled a heart-wrenching
letter sent to the Sunday Times by a man who had just lost
his son in a car accident. He objected to the furor surrounding
cloning, appealing that if this technology was made available,
his son could be brought back to life (14).
Our own death, and the death of others, is extremely difficult
to cope with. However, I am afraid that for those hankering
after immortality, or grieving for their lost loved ones,
cloning offers no solution. The proposal that having one's
clone made is equivalent to being resurrected, is false. Cloning
does not provide the sort of immortality that we usually want.
I believe that the most important feature of wanting to live
forever is, wanting to experience the future of that immortal
life in the same direct way that one experiences the present
The way that I have experiences now, is part of the present
stream of consciousness. To have future experiences in the
same way, those future experiences must be part of the same
stream. Thus, in order to achieve immortality, I need my clone
to believe that she is me and remember living my life up to
the moment when I died. The clone must see herself as waking
from my death, in a similar way to how I wake from my sleep
every morning. There must be a strong psychological continuity
between the me that died and the me that is resurrected (my
clone), up to the extent that my present stream of consciousness
seems to be the continuation of the stream that I had before
I died. However, if I have a clone of myself made, her consciousness
will be in no way continuous with mine. My stream of consciousness
will cease when I die. Her's will start when she is born.
My clone's stream of consciousness will have no connection
with mine; it will be her own individual stream of consciousness.
The reason that some people believe that they can resurrect
dead relatives, or live forever by cloning is that they are
misconceiving what human cloning actually can produce. One
thing that they are overlooking is that the person produced
by cloning will actually be born as a baby. Most people seem
to presume that clones emerge fully-grown from womb tanks
or some such contraption. However, we cannot literally photocopy
people. My clone would not be an instant carbon copy of me
at age twenty-one. She would gestate for nine months inside
a woman's womb, (perhaps even mine), and be born as a baby.
Moreover, even when she reaches twenty-one, she will not be
identical to me at age twenty-one. The problem here is that
people are mixing up genetic identity with personal identity.
They are subscribing to genetic determinism; the idea that,
genes are sufficient to make us who we are. However, monozygotic
(identical) twins and conjoined (Siamese) twins are illustrative
of the implausibility of this view. Both monozygotic and conjoined
twins originate from the same zygote and so are genetically
identical, however each twin is a different person with a
different personality. This is strikingly illustrated by cases
of Siamese twins. "Eng and Chang, the original Siamese twins,
and the closest humans ever "cloned" at all, developed distinct
and divergent personalities. One became a morose alcoholic
and the other remained a benign and cheerful man." (15) Likewise,
another set of conjoined twins, the Tocci twins show a similar
pattern. Like Eng, Giovanni Tocci drank beer in considerable
quantities whereas Giacomo did not like beer and preferred
mineral water. In addition, Giovanni an introvert (and fond
of sketching), whereas Giacomo was more extraverted, and had
a volatile personality (if he found some fault in Giovanni's
sketch would kick the drawing off "his" knee.) (16)
Furthermore, environmental influences play a huge role in
making us who we are. Every choice we make causes our life
path to branch out in different ways making an impact on our
identity. For instance, I would have been a different person
if I had not come to the University of Kent. I would have
had different experiences and met different people. My university
experiences have had impact on how I see or identify myself.
I do not simply mean by this that if I had not come to Kent
I would have had different memories and so be a different
person. Although this is true, it does not capture the full
implication of my view. My university experiences have not
just given me different memories, in addition they have moulded
me and altered my personality. For example, my experience
with philosophy has probably made me a more rational and thoughtful
person. The idea, that environment shapes a person; underlies
Harris's thought experiment detailing why it would be impossible
to resurrect Lenin. He states,
"Lenin's embalmed body lies in its mausoleum in Moscow. Presumably
a cell of this body could be denucleated and Lenin's genome
cloned. Could such a process make Lenin immortal?…Vladimir
Ilyich Ulyanov was born on 10th April 1870 in the town of
the Simbirsk on the Volga. It is this person who became and
is known to us as V. I. Lenin. Even with this man's genome
preserved intact we will never see Lenin again. So many things
that made Vladimir Ilyich what he was cannot be reproduced,
even if his genome can. We cannot recreate prerevoluntionary
Russia. We cannot stimulate his environment and education;
we cannot recreate his parents to bring him up and influence
his development as profoundly as they undoubtedly did. We
cannot make the thought of Karl Marx seem as hopeful as it
must then have been; we cannot, in short, do anything but
reproduce his genome and that could never be nearly enough."
(17)
The naivety of genetic determinism is emphasised by the fact
that genetic identity does not even constitute biological
identity. Even cloned cells with identical sets of genes vary
somewhat in shape and colouration. The variations are so subtle
they can usually be ignored. However when cells are combined
to form organisms, the differences become marked and individuality
is born. "Two genetically identical individuals will unfold
in slightly different ways. The shape or the kidneys or curve
of the skull won't be quite the same" (18). Moreover, with
the brain, the organ regarded as the seat of consciousness,
the differences become profound. Johnson states, "Back of
the envelope calculations show how much information a human
genome contains and how much is required to specify the trillions
of connections in a single brain. The conclusion is inescapable:
the problem of wiring up the brain is complex that it is beyond
the power of the genomic computer. The best the genes can
do is indicate the rough layout of the wiring…Neurons at the
early stage, are thrown together more or less at random and
then left to their own devices. After birth experience makes
and breaks these connections, pruning the thicket into precise
circuitry." (19) From the beginning what is in the genes is
different from what is in the mind, experience serves to widen
the gap.
The Alleged Wisdom of Repugnance
The concept of cloning humans has become victim to what Tom
Wilke, who runs the biomedical section of the Wellcome Trust
in London, calls the Yuk factor (20). The Yuk factor is a
shorthand term for describing the visceral fear and unease
generated in the public by new biomedical advances. The variety
of derogatory adjectives associated with human cloning such
as, "revolting", "repugnant", "repulsive" and "grotesque"
are illustrative of the fact that, the public finds the whole
idea profoundly "yuk". The aim of this section is to uncover
exactly how important these feelings of disgust and unease
are for the morality of cloning. Indeed, many bioethical committees
have suggested that these feelings are indicative of the immorality
of cloning. For example, the report of the U.S.A's NBAC (National
Bioethics Advisory Committee), "repeatedly cited the "strong
discomfort, even revulsion" of most Americans against cloning
as if revulsion was itself a moral argument against such cloning"
(21). This stance is also a feature of Leon Kass's essay,
"The Wisdom of Repugnance". He claims that the repugnance
we feel when faced with the prospect of human cloning is "
the emotional expression of a deep wisdom, beyond reason's
power fully to articulate it". According to Kass, "we … feel
immediately…without argument the wrongness of cloning humans".
He seems to be suggesting that the emotions function as a
kind of sixth sense, that immediately detects the rightness
and wrongness of a practice. Both he and the NBAC seem to
be subscribing to a doctrine often dubbed sentimental morality.
The idea that "where people's moral sentiments are outraged
by the very idea of something, this fact of itself shows that
what outrages them contravenes morality" (22). The idea of
sentimental morality originates with and was elaborated by
the 18th century philosopher, Hume. It is unclear as to what
extent the NBAC and Kass adhere to Hume's moral philosophy
(they never explicitly mention him), however the basic principle
appears to be the same; "Morality is more properly felt than
judg'd of" (23)
The most frequently used counter-argument against the idea
that our emotions of unease and disgust play a crucial role
in determining whether human cloning (or indeed any other
new technology or practice) is morally permissible, is the
observation that our reactions to new technology and practices
change. Some of yesterday's repugnances are today calmly accepted.
For example, in the 1950's it was against the law in Britain
to save a patient's eyesight by grafting a dead person's corneas
on to a patient's eyes. (24) This was not a legal oversight,
people found the idea deeply "yuk", and it took a prolonged
journalistic campaign to get the law changed. The idea that
feelings change, somewhat undermines Kass's view that the
emotions act like extrasensory preceptors that detect right
and wrong. However, I am not convinced that the mere fact
that we get used to a new technology, and begin to accommodate
and accept it, serves as a valid argument for it. To quote
Raskolinikov, the protagonist of Fyoder Dostoyevsky's Crime
and Punishment, "Man gets used to everything - the beast".
All that is happening is that our distaste is turning to approval.
We are still in the realm of feelings. How do we know whether
these feelings are any more right than our former feelings?
The problem with the "feeling" approach to ethics is that
it assumes that a sense of outrage and unease is always a
sense of moral outrage and unease. However, this does not
necessarily seem the case. Many of our feelings can be classified
differently. For example, we are familiar with talking about,
feelings of squeamishness and aesthetic feelings, as well
as feelings of prejudice. If the Yuk factor can be equated
with or not be properly distinguished from these other feelings
then we should not give it any moral weight. Those who subscribe
to sentimental morality owe us an account of how to distinguish
our moral feelings from these other sorts of feelings. We
need to know exactly what it is about moral feelings that
entitle them to the prefix "moral". If we knew this we could
describe a prejudiced feeling of disgust against using dead
people's corneas to restore sight to patient's eyes, as changing
to an enlightened moral feeling for it. Moreover, we need
to ascertain whether moral feelings alone, do indeed determine
the morality of a new technology, practice or action.
I personally believe that we can distinguish moral feelings
from other feelings, however I do not think this is an avenue
that Kass and the NBAC would want to follow. I would contend
that for something to count as a moral feeling a special type
of thought about the object, action or practice must accompany
it. This differs from the views of Kass and the NBAC. They
seem to presume that our feelings of moral approval and disapproval
do not need to be related to particular thoughts or beliefs
about the object, practice or action, in order to make them
moral. Indeed, the idea that a moral feeling of disgust and
repugnance comes to our attention independently of any thought
about the practice of cloning humans, is suggested by Steve
Holtzman's statement to the NBAC. He asserts that, "there
is a very human tendency to know what one wants to do but
not be clear about necessarily why". This stance is echoed
in Kass's contention that our emotions possess a wisdom that
is incapable of being articulated by reason. We feel a special
type of feeling and this tells us that cloning is wrong. Unfortunately,
for Holzman and Kass this line of argument might be employed
by a racist or a sexist. Moreover, it forces us to count wacky
beliefs, such as the belief that that a man who clasps his
hands three times an hour deserves moral approval, as an acceptable
moral belief. (25) If a person feels approval at these things,
sentimental morality can do little more than nod its head.
If I protest to Kass that I do not feel repugnance at the
thought of human clones, he would probably accuse me of having
warped moral feelings (after all he does seem to regard his
position as objectively right). However, because he is dedicated
to sentimental morality, Kass cannot give a reason as to why
my feelings are warped, without abandoning his theory. Without
anything to appeal to other than feelings, sentimental morality
reaches an early stalemate on moral issues.
However, we need not take this view about feelings of moral
approval and disapproval. Following Phillipa Foot, (26) we
can assert that we cannot logically feel moral approval or
disapproval at just anything. We need to have certain beliefs
and thoughts about the object, practice or action that we
are evaluating in order to evaluate it as either morally good,
or bad, respectively. In order to be worthy of the prefix
moral, our moral feelings should be connected to particular
features about the object, practice or action. If feelings
do not show this relation then they are incorrectly called
moral feelings. Foot attempts to gain support for the idea
that there are logical limits to what a person can morally
approve or disapprove by discussing some other mental attitudes,
which she sees as being related in a certain way to their
objects. For example, Foot suggests that there are logical
limits to the things a man can be proud of, about which he
can indeed feel pride. Pride is not simply an internal sensation,
"so that one might naturally beat one's breast and say 'pride
is something I feel here'". Foot asserts that, "Given any
description of an object, action, personal characteristic
etc., it is not possible to rule it out as an object of pride".
She claims that before we do so we need to what would be said
of it by a man who is proud of it, or feels proud of it. The
characteristic object of pride is something that is seen as
in some way a man's own and as some sort of achievement. Unless
the object fulfils this criteria a feeling pride cannot be
ascribed. Thus, Foot comments that the idea that someone can
feel proud of something like the sky or the sea is nonsensical,
or at least nonsensical in normal circumstances. We can only
make sense of such a feeling as pride if we make a special
assumption about the person's beliefs, for example that "he
is under some crazy delusion that he has saved the sky from
falling, or the sea from drying up." Foot goes on to suggest
that a person can only feel moral disapproval towards an object,
action or practice if they believe that the object will cause
harm in some way. Similarly, they can only feel moral approval
if they feel that it will benefit people in some way. Thus,
it would be impossible to count the clasping of hands as a
moral virtue because there is absolutely no point to it. There
is no way in which it (without a special background) could
cause benefit or harm to anyone. The plausibility of Foot's
stance is vindicated by our response to a thought experiment.
Imagine you are watching a catwalk show, two models walk up
the catwalk, one wearing a fur coat and the other wearing
a green poker-dotted suit. You feel disgusted by both these
outfits. However, you would probably not feel inclined to
count the disgust felt at the poker-dotted suit as a moral
feeling. I would contend that this is because it is connected
merely to the look of the outfit, the outfit is not harmful
in any way. You would be inclined however, to count the feeling
of disgust at the fur coat as a moral feeling. This is because
your disgust can feasibly be connected to harm. It is a response
to the suffering caused to the animals slaughtered to make
this coat and others like it.
An objection might be made at this point, that I unfairly
dismissed Kass and the NBAC's sentimental morality from being
able to distinguish between moral feelings and other feelings.
Do not Kass and the NBAC believe that human cloning is harmful?
They do, however the problem with their view (and the reason
they are unable to distinguish between moral feelings and
other feelings) is why they think human cloning is harmful.
The trouble with the views of Kass and the NBAC are that they
suggest that our special feelings of moral repugnance alone
prove conclusively that cloning is immoral and harmful. Foot
however does not make such a strong suggestion. She says that
our moral feelings are connected with the thought that this
object causes harm. We cannot feel moral repugnance unless
we hold the belief that cloning causes harm. This differs
from Kass and the NBAC who suggest that our feeling of moral
repugnance shows that cloning causes harm. Thus, Foot's viewpoint
allows for the possibility that our thoughts (and so our feelings)
are wrong. For example, we could be under a delusional belief,
or simply mistaken, about what the practice, object or action
actually amounts to. The second possibility seems to be a
common phenomenon with regard to cloning. A lot of our feelings
are based on misconceptions about cloning. For instance, people
are often disturbed by cloning because they feel that if someone
cloned them the resulting clone would be identical in looks,
personality and beliefs. They regard cloning as a threat to
their sense of individuality. However, as we have seen this
is to confuse genetic identity with personal identity. The
fact we have strong emotions about cloning functions as a
flag, warning us to watch carefully here; however, our feelings
do not determine the morality of this practice. In order to
determine the morality of cloning, we must make sure that
our thoughts and beliefs about this practice stem from the
facts, not science fiction.
The unnaturalness of cloning
It has been claimed that our fear of human cloning is related
to the fact that cloning is unnatural. This fact is often
thought to give justification to our feelings of "yuk". However,
I believe that in its most straightforward sense, this argument
is a non-starter. Cloning does deviate from our natural means
of reproduction, but this fact alone is not sufficient to
render it immoral. If unnaturalness were indicative of the
ethical unacceptability of a practice, then the whole of modern
medicine would be rendered immoral. Any medical intervention
is an attempt to prevent or modify a natural process. If we
took this idea seriously we would have a duty to let a young
girl who had stopped breathing die, rather than attempt to
revive her with mouth-mouth resuscitation. A view that leads
to such conclusions is untenable.
Human Dignity
In this section, I shall examine the claim that cloning is
offensive to human dignity. Appeals to human dignity and our
moral obligation to protect it has been an almost universal
feature of the official responses to cloning, as well as a
stable argument in more popular commentaries provided by the
media. The statement from Dr. Hiroshii, director of the World
Health Organisation (WHO) is a perfect example. Dr. Hiroshii
states, "WHO considers the use of cloning for the replication
of human individuals to be an ethically unacceptable act as
it would violate some of the basic principles that govern
medically assisted procreation. These include respect for
the dignity of the human being". (27)UNESCO takes a similar
line. UNESCO's "Universal Declaration on the Human Genome
and Human Rights" states that "Practices which are contrary
to human dignity such as the reproductive cloning of human
beings shall not be permitted." (28) This section will explore
the questions arising from the assertion that cloning is contrary
to human dignity. The most obvious question being, are they
right? Does the idea that cloning sits in opposition to human
dignity have any validity? More specifically, this section
will explore whether cloning is intrinsically contrary to
human dignity; or whether it is particular features of particular
applications of cloning, that are contrary to human dignity.
This is a significant point, if the latter is the case, Dr.
Hiroshii and others like him will have no justification for
condemning cloning per se. They will have to allow that cloning
in itself is not wrong, only specific applications of it.
Before I explore the question of whether cloning is contrary
to human dignity, we need to be clear about what this concept
actually is. Unfortunately, dignity, despite being an intuitively
attractive concept is incredibly nebulous and notoriously
difficult to define. Although we think we know what the concept
means, it seems to elude strict definition. Thus, it is perhaps
easier to get a feel of the concept by appealing to examples.
For instance, we might say that people in war-ridden countries
such as Kosovo and Sierra Leone find it difficult to retain
a sense of dignity. A recent report from Sierra Leone talked
about how the inhabitants of Freetown were attempting to get
on with their daily lives and keep a sense of dignity after
many of their friends and relatives were massacred in a vicious
rebel attack. Moreover, we might regard dying of a degenerative
disease such as Huntington's disease and Alzheimer's disease
as undignified. Indeed, advocates of euthanasia, often claim
that euthanasia offers patients with terminal illnesses the
chance to die with dignity. Dignity seems to be connected
with the idea that humans have certain fundamental needs,
desires and attributes. Thus, to treat a person as a person,
is to recognise and respect these needs, desires and attributes.
A useful analogy here might be a hen in a battery cage. Animal
rights activists often claim that keeping hens in battery
cages is unethical because the cages do not allow the hens
to satisfy fundamental needs or desires, such as the need
or desire to stretch their wings. Similarly, the rebel attack
on the citizens of Freetown was a disregard for human dignity
because the rebels were refusing to recognise the needs, desires
and attributes of the occupants of Freetown. The rebel attack
refused to respect that the citizens of Freetown were autonomous
individuals, and that they had their own plans and projects
for life. Instead, the rebel soldiers saw them as a way to
achieve their own project, the usurpation of the current Sierra
Leone government. The picture of a father reading to his child,
shown when the reporter talked about the individuals attempting
to retain dignity, poignantly illustrates this point. The
father and child were pursuing their own project and leading
their own lives.
When we turn to questions of what human dignity is, we cannot
avoid turning to Kant's doctrine of "Respect for Persons"
(29). Indeed, my above example, seems to have Kantian elements
to it. Kant believed that we should use a person never simply
as a means but also treat them as an end. To fully understand
what Kant means by this we must further elaborate the term
"means" and the term "ends". The word "end" seems to have
been used by Kant to mean "that which is valuable in itself"
In contrast, to regard something as valuable as a means, is
to regard it as valuable merely for what one can get out of
it – it is no more than useful. Applying this to persons,
we can say that the meaning of the injunction, to treat and
regard people not merely as means but also as ends, is that
we ought to treat them as valuable in themselves and not only
as useful instruments to our own goals. This still leaves
some confusion; for example, what do we mean by "valuable
in itself"? I would contend that to regard something as valuable
in itself, we must cherish it for what it is, we must care
about its essential features-those which make it what it is.
Thus, respecting persons seems to be synonymous with respecting
a generic human self, or respecting the features that make
us human and give us our human natures. Kant felt that the
distinctive feature of a human was his rational will. This
faculty gives a human being his distinctive ability to choose
for himself, and to formulate purposes, plans and policies
of his own. People alone can act from reasons, as opposed
to be acted on from external causes. Kant claimed that it
was inconsistent with treating an individual as a free and
rational being, to ever use him as a mere means to the satisfaction
to our own goals. To do so denies him his autonomy.
In the context of cloning, the Kantian notion of using someone
as a means rather than treating them as an end, is often invoked
by commentators to provide basis for the objection that human
cloning is contrary to human dignity. Moreover, rights such
as the right to a unique genetic identity and the right to
two parents, are also appealed to. The commentators seem to
suppose that we need these rights to protect features that
make us human; thus, these rights can be seen as being closely
connected to human dignity.
Instrumentalisation
The idea of using an individual as means, rather than treating
them as end, is sometimes termed instrumentalisation. The
consultation document of the Human Genetics Advisory Commission,
"Cloning Issues in Reproduction, Science and Medicine", identifies
three cases in which cloning by nuclear transfer might involve
the instrumental use of the child created in that way:
- A parent wishing to "replace"
a dead child.
- Producing by cloning,
a sibling of a dying child, in order to supply compatible
organs or tissues.
- Seeking to use cloning
in an attempt to cheat death
Moreover, Axel Kahn claims
that non-reproductive cloning, or tissue regeneration, violates
the Kantian notion of treating humans as ends.
"The creation of human clones solely for spare cell lines
would, from a philosophical point of view, be in obvious contradiction
to the principle expressed by Emmanuel Kant: that of human
dignity. This principle demands that an individual – and I
would extend this to read human life – should never be thought
of as a means, but also as an end. Created human life for
the sole purpose of preparing therapeutic material would clearly
not be for the dignity of the life created" (30)
Furthermore, it has been claimed that embryo twinning is instrumental.
In the future, it could be possible to allow genetic and other
screening by embryo biopsy. Embryo splitting could be used
to provide a twin embryo for biopsy, permitting an embryo,
undamaged by invasive procedures, to be available for implantation,
following the result of the biopsy on its twin. Some commentators
feel that in this case one twin has been sacrificed for the
sake of the other.
The first objections I shall examine, are Kahn's objections
to using embryos to create therapeutic material, as well as
the objections to using embryo splitting to provide a twin
for biopsy. These cases are different in kind, from those
involving reproductive cloning by nuclear transplantation
because, it is highly controversial as to whether human embryos
fall within the scope of Kant's, or any other moral principle.
If they do not, Kant's principle is ill applied and objections
involving this principle invalid.
The key question here is: do embryos have a right to life?
If they do it would seem unjustified to sacrifice the life
of one embryo for another embryo or fully-grown human being.
However, as Tooley (31) has noted, the only beings that have
a right to life are those who can conceive of themselves as
distinct entities existing over time. His argument is based
on the claim that there is a conceptual connection between
the desires a being is capable of having, and the rights which
it is said to have. Embryos that would be used in tissue regeneration
and biopsy are bundles of two to eight cells. They are not
conscious, yet alone self-conscious, and so cannot be said
to have any desires.
Other philosophers have replied that although an embryo is
not capable of desiring, it has the potential to develop into
a creature that can; and therefore we should allow embryos
the right to life. However, as Harris has noted we are all
potentially dead, but this does not appear to constitute a
reason for treating us as dead now. (32) Moreover, some embryo
cells become a part of the placenta not a part of a self-conscious
person.
I will now turn to the cases involving cloning by nuclear
transfer. To reiterate these cases were:
- A parent using cloning
in order to replace a dead child
- A person seeking to use
cloning in an attempt to cheat death
- Producing by cloning,
a sibling of a dying child, in order to have a compatible
organ or tissue donor.
However, before we consider
whether the children in these cases are being treated as a
means rather than ends, we need to separate cloning fact from
cloning fiction. In their extreme versions, cases A and B
embody the confusions about identity mentioned in "Misconceptions:
Cloning, Identity and Immortality"; namely the idea, to reformulate
an old phrase, that the genes maketh the man. However, it
has been established that genetic identity does not constitute
personal or even biological identity. It is impossible to
re-create any human being, even physiologically. Thus, the
new child produced by cloning would not be a carbon copy of
the first child, and cloning would not be an effective way
of achieving immortality. Separated from these confusions,
all these cases raise questions about the instrumental use
of another human being, but the questions are not tied to
the cloning aspect. One could decide to have a child in the
normal way for any of these motives; to replace a dead child,
to create a compatible organ or tissue donor, and to ensure
that something of oneself survives one's own death, for example,
when a child is engendered to provide a heir.
However, the Kantian principle is indeterminate. Although
there are extreme cases that we see as definitely instrumental,
for example slavery; and those at the other end of the spectrum
that we can see as definitely not instrumental, for instance,
a close friendship; there are a great many cases falling in
between these two extremes where it is confusing as to whether
the Kantian principle applies or not. John Harris thinks that
if we seriously applied the Kantian principle, we would have
to outlaw blood transfusions. "The beneficiary neither knowing
of, nor usually caring about the anonymous donor uses the
blood (and its donor) as a means to her own ends". (33) Similarly,
R.E. Lewonlin (34) says that we could be regarded as treating
the plumber we call in to fix the kitchen sink instrumentally.
It has been argued however, that these two examples miss a
crucial restriction that Kant places on instrumentalisation.
They overlook the emphasis Kant placed on the word "exclusively".
Kant does not states that one must not treat a person as a
means, he adds the qualification that one must never treat
a person exclusively as a means. Thus, it might be argued
that we can exclude the above examples as cases of instrumentalisation
because in these cases the person is not being treated exclusively
as a means. For example, in the case of the plumber it can
be claimed that although I only require the plumber to fix
my kitchen sink, I recognise that this is not his sole purpose,
I realise and I think it would be fair to say that most people
realise, that he has a life outside his occupation. Likewise,
if the beneficiary of the blood donation took time to reflect,
she would not envisage her donor as a blood letting machine,
rather as a person who just happened to give blood. Unlike
the slave owner who thinks that his slave exists solely to
fulfil his needs, the beneficiary recognises that the donor
has other aspects to his life. The importance of emphasizing
"exclusively" has been used insightfully in the context of
cloning. In a response to the Consultation Document of the
Human Genetic Advisory Commission, the Centre of Applied Ethics
at the University of Kent seems to use this distinction to
form its position on instrumental uses of cloning. Focusing
on cases A (replacing a child) and B (wanting something of
oneself to survive after ones death), the Centre states that
"it might be maintained that having a child simply for that
reason would amount to an instrumental use of that child."
However, the Centre goes on to say that if other motives can
also be attributed to the parents, then it is possible to
square cases A and B with Kantian dictates.
"...having a child because one wanted to bring into life another
human being who would have a full and satisfying life would
be a paradigmatically non-instrumental reason for having a
child. And if that reason for having a child is strengthened
by the desire to replace a dead child, or the thought that
something of ones biological identity might continue to live
after one's death, that does not turn the reason in to a paradigmatically
non-instrumental one"
Some commentators have much stronger views that this. They
claim that instrumental parental intentions do not matter
at all. What is significant, is how you treat the child once
it is born. R.E. Lewonwin (35)states that he " was conceived
out of my father's desires for a male heir". However, he claims
that "In retrospect, I am glad they were my parents". He believes
that to condemn human cloning because it might sometimes be
used for instrumental purposes is to miss both the complexity
of human motivation and the unpredictability of developing
personal relationships. He points out that there is "Not a
simple relation between those initial motivations and the
resulting family relations". I think Lewonwin makes a valid
point. I believe that how the child is treated once he or
she is born is of greater moral significance than the reasons
a parent has for wanting a child. One can decide to have a
baby for the best reasons in the world, and yet when faced
with the reality, can become a truly appalling parent. However,
I feel that Lewonwin's view overlooks the practical reality
of cloning. With reproductive technologies there is a third
party involved, the clinic, whom have a responsibility to
ensure as much as they possibly can (in many ways to protect
themselves) that the child they help create is well-treated.
Therefore, it will be "safer" for them to err on the side
of caution and exclude parents with purely instrumental motives.
Although initial parental motivations are not a conclusive
indication of how the child will be looked after, they are
the best indication that the clinic will have.
I think that "replacing" a child by cloning is more ethically
problematic than "replacing" a child through normal reproduction.
I am not entirely happy about the term replacing as it masks
the complexity of the situation. What we are actually talking
about is a situation where a person had no intentions of having
any other children, but because of the death of their child,
decided to have another child. My problem with cloning is
that I do not understand why the parent should decide to have
a child by cloning, rather than conceive a child in the normal
way. Why insist on cloning? I feel that the parent may be
taking the idea of "replacing" too literally, that they are
subscribing to genetic determinism and are under the illusion
that they can get their child back. A subscription to genetic
determinism is a conceptual blunder; however, I believe that
holding this belief can lead a person to make moral blunders.
It could prevent the parents from treating and valuing their
child as a unique individual. The parents might constantly
compare the second child with the first and scold or chide
him for not acting the way he should or liking the things
he should like (given that he was engendered to be a carbon
copy of his brother). Thus, the child would feel he was living
his life in someone else's shadow. I feel that this would
be an oppressive and psychologically disabling burden to bear.
Perhaps there are exception cases. Lee Silver (36)uses an
example of a woman whose two young children have died in a
car accident. This woman is now infertile. Although she conceived
her first children in the normal way, several months after
their births she under went chemotherapy for the treatment
of cancer. The treatment, although a success, left her sterile.
Silver suggests that a physician in the hospital retrieved
tissue samples from the children shortly after their death
and froze them to preserve them. He then goes on to suggest
that two years later, when the parents have got over their
loss, the physician informs the couple of his actions and
tells them how it might be possible for them to have their
own genetic children by cloning. In this very unusual circumstance,
cloning to "replace" a child does not seem ethically unacceptable.
We feel that because of the time lapse, the parents will not
see their new children as new individuals. I am however, slightly
concerned with how contrived Silver's example is. I do not
think that there would be too many physicians that would have
removed tissue from a dead child without telling (or getting
permission from) the parents. This is significant because
the time lapsing between the children's death, and their knowledge
of the preserved tissue, means that they have had time to
come to terms with their children's death. One fear is that
if this were an option for parents in the midst of grief,
they would be more likely to see the new child, not as a new
individual, but as their old child born again.
The case of the creating a child to provide an organ donor,
or tissue donor, for a dying child is more difficult to classify
than the first two cases. The reason for this is that there
are some instances of organ donation that we would see as
unequivocally instrumental, whereas other cases are more controversial.
It clearly makes a significant difference whether we are cloning
a child in order to use an irreplaceable organ, such as a
heart, or cloning a child in order to use a replaceable resource
such as a person's bone marrow. It hardly needs to be said
that giving birth to a child and then ripping its heart out
is an instrumental and extremely wicked use of a child. The
child will die; one child is literally being sacrificed to
save another. However, extracting a child's bone marrow is
relatively risk free. The child will be able to replenish
his resources of bone marrow and go on to live a normal healthy
life. Despite this, many commentators still have reservations.
They imply that although this procedure will not physically
damage the child it will psychologically impair. Fitzgerald
comments, "What sense of equality or dignity does a child
begin to possess when the realization dawns that he or she
was produced ... principally to provide a biological part
for another" (37). I think we can apply the idea that instrumental
motives cease to be instrumental motives if they are squared
with non-instrumental motives in order to answer Fitzgerald.
To give birth to a child, extract its bone marrow and then
abandon it, is to treat it instrumentally or "principally
to provide a biological part for another". A child who later
in his life decides to find his real or biological family
would definitely feel used and treated unjustly if he discovered
that they had given him away because he had served his purpose.
However, if a parent has the desire to have a child in order
to provide their other child with new bone marrow, combined
with the desire to provide the new child with a full and satisfying
life, this action is not purely instrumental. In such cases,
we feel that the child will be appreciated as much as the
first child. The child may ask questions in later life about
why they were produced, however I think that the parent would
be able to reassure them that they were wanted for and are
now appreciated for who they are. The way they have been treated
and loved is surely evidence for this. Marissa Ayala, a child
engendered by normal reproduction to provide her dying sister
with compatible bone marrow does not seem to feel devalued
by this fact. Indeed, in a CNN interview she is said to have
"positively beamed when she told the interviewer, 'I saved
her (her sister Anissa's) life'" (38).
However, given the possibility of tissue regeneration, I do
not think that this application will be often used. Deciding
to have a child, a tremendous commitment anyway; to provide
tissue for a dying child, is a heavyweight decision and only
considered as a last resort. Tissue regeneration provides
an alternative, and an ethically less problematic option.
The most important point, however, is that there is nothing
intrinsically instrumental about producing a child by cloning.
Although, authorities such as WHO and UNESCO could maintain
that particular applications of cloning are instrumental they
cannot sensibility assert that cloning per se is instrumental,
which is what they seem to be doing in their statements. Two
more possible uses of cloning that have been suggested are
the case of lesbian couples who want to have children, and
cases in which one or both partners are infertile. There seems
nothing necessarily or inherently instrumental about these
proposals.
The Right to a Unique Genetic Identity
In their discussions of cloning, the European Parliament (39)
appealed to the idea that, "each individual has a right to
his or her own genetic identity". According to the European
Parliament, having a genome identical to someone else is objectionable,
and more significantly transgresses a fundamental human right.
Despite the European Parliament's stamp of approval, the notion
of a right to a unique genetic identity seems somewhat confused.
Firstly, it is unclear who could possess such a right. The
person who is born as the result of cloning is certainly not
a contender, because he would not have existed if he had not
been cloned. Such a right, "reverses the proper logical relationship
between rights and identity; one's identity as an individual
is what gives rise to rights, rather than itself being the
content of a right" (40). Moreover, it is difficult to sensibly
maintain that one can have a right to an individual genetic
identity given the presence of a large number of naturally
conceived genetically identical individuals. The natural occurrence
of monozygotic twins is one in 270 pregnancies. Thus, in the
United Kingdom, with a population of about 58 million, over
200 thousand such pregnancies have occurred. As Harris sardonically
notes, "How are we to regard human rights violations on such
a grand scale?" (41) Moreover, it is incorrect to suggest
that clones produced by nuclear transfer share the exact genotype
of their parents (although, clones produced by embryo twinning
do share the same genotype as each other). The Mitochondrial
DNA of the clone is different from that of its parent. Therefore,
one could say that such a right is not an objection to cloning
by nuclear transfer, only embryo twinning.
However, although perhaps not best formulated in terms of
the right to a genetic identity, the issues and motivational
factors behind this right are comprehensible. Appeals to such
a right reflects the general public's fear and confusions
about cloning. For example, the idea that the clone will have
an identical personality and beliefs to the person it was
cloned from. However, as we determined in "Misconceptions:
Cloning Identity and Immortality", this fear is ungrounded.
Genetic identity is not personal identity. My individuality
is the result of having a unique consciousness with a unique
personal history, shaped not only by genetic inheritance but
also by environmental, social and biological factors. The
experience of identical twins indicates that a unique genetic
identity is not essential for a human being to feel, and be,
individual.
Lederberg (42) however still feels that there is a problem
with people sharing the same genetic make up. He points out
that with clones, someone has made the choice that such and
such a person should be genetically identical to another.
The result of this is that clones suffer a "genetic bondage",
which diminishes autonomy as it reduces the option of choices
that create individuality. However, it is unclear why someone
who has been cloned will have less autonomy than someone produced
by normal sexual reproduction. If genes restrict our choices,
then everyone is faced with the same restriction determined
by the genes they have. Whether someone has picked our genotype,
or not, is simply irrelevant.
However, even when the myth of genetic determinism is dispelled,
some doubts about cloning and identity remain. These doubts
concern the creation of multiples. We seem to be able to cope
with the thought of being one of a pair of clones. This is
not any more disturbing than being one of a pair of identical
twins. However, the thought of being one of a large number
(perhaps a hundred) of cloned individuals makes us intensely
uneasy. What we seem to be reacting to is the fact that we
would all look alike. We realise that "a person's individual
identity is not constituted by his/her genetic identity" however
it appears that "one's sense of individuality is at least
in part determined by one's distinctive physical appearance."
(43) The importance of a person's distinct physical appearance
is demonstrated by the fact that this is used, by others,
to immediately identity them. Indeed there are people that
we identity only by physical appearance, for example the girl
who serves at the shop or waits at the bus stop. If there
were a hundred people that looked the same it would be harder
for the outside world to tell them apart and consequentially
treat them as separate individuals. To others, you would become
a token of a type, a Gary or a Jon. One can imagine a certain
physical appearance having a certain stereotype associated
with it. If others treated you as type it would be difficult
for you to feel like an individual. This can be illustrated
by our reaction to being described as a typical member of
a group (for example, a typical student). We find this offensive,
we do not like to be thought of as being the same as everyone
else. If we are to be defined in reference to a group, we
prefer being thought of as the exceptional member, for example,
a brilliant musician. If being a part of a multiple threatens
our sense of individuality (a feeling that seems to be of
utmost importance to us), then this seems a good reason for
condemning this application of cloning and not allowing the
technique to be used in this way. However, to be honest this
does not seem application of the human cloning technique that
has been seriously envisaged. Apart from the unlikeliness
of some actually wanting to create a hundred clones, it also
seems impractical. How is this person going to convince a
hundred women to bring these children to term and who is going
look after them after their birth?
The Right to Two Parents
The right to two parents is perhaps the most bizarre right
to have emerged from discussions about the ethics of cloning.
Bentham's felt rights were "nonsense on stilts"; this right
certainly seems worthy of his label. The idea of having two
parents is, in itself, unclear. What are the commentators
objecting to, not having two parents to look after the clone
once it is born or, not having two genetic parents? If it
is the former, then it is of course only violated if the clone
if brought up in a one-parent family. This does not necessarily
seem to be the case; there are many infertile couples who
would like the opportunity to have a child through cloning.
Moreover, if there is such a right, it is widely violated.
Furthermore, there is no evidence of any harm produced by
its violation. Single mothers are likely to find such a proposal
highly insulting. If it is the latter, then it is not violated
through cloning. It is false to regard the nucleus donor as
the genetic parent of the child. The clone is the twin brother
or sister (delayed twin if you like) of the nucleus donor,
and the genetic offspring of the nucleus donor's own parents.
It is simply impossible to have less than two genetic parents.
There is one way in which cloning could violate the right
to two genetic parents. The de-nucleated egg into which the
nucleus is placed, contains mitochondrial DNA. The presence
of the mitochondrial DNA means that the genetic inheritance
of clones is richer, or more variously derived, than that
of other individuals. If what is important is that an individual
contains genetic material from more than one person, then
the commentators seem to be committed to saying, "Two parents
good, three parents better".
Although I have characterised this right as nonsensical, the
motivation behind it is intelligible. However, the motivation
loses much of its intelligibility when formulated in the language
of rights. Behind the appeals to the right to two parents
is a concern that cloning will effect the genetic diversity
of mankind. Sexual reproduction seems to have evolved for
the purpose of staying ahead of ever-mutating pathogens. Novel
combinations of genes, created through reproduction, help
immune systems devise defenses against rapidly evolving germs,
viruses and parasites. The fear is that if human beings were
cloned, pathogens would get the upper hand, causing widespread
disease. The analogy, often cited is the effect of a lot of
farmers, in one area, adopting the same corn hybrid. If the
hybrid is susceptible to a particular bug, the crop fails.
However, such an effect is only plausible if there are millions
of clones of one person – which is extremely unlikely. With
cloning there might be a slight increase in the number of
identical twins and triplets, thus the risk of raging epidemics
is no more likely than it is a present. This fear is misplaced.
Conclusion
In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke suggests
that one function of philosophy is to clear "the ground a
little" and remove "some of the rubbish that lies in the way
of knowledge" (44). Human cloning is a topic in which much
"rubbish" lies in the way of knowledge and sound thinking.
I believe that once we have cleared "the ground a little"
and dispelled the myths of genetic determinism, cloning is
less of an ethical threat than initially thought. As we have
seen, cloning is not intrinsically instrumental, and not always
a threat to individuality. Specific applications of cloning
could be regarded as instrumental; for example creating a
clone for a nonrenewable resource, such as a heart; or a threat
to our individuality, for instance, the creation of multiples.
However, this does not justify pronouncing cloning per se
immoral, only specific applications of it. Cloning can be
used for good ends; for example, tissue regeneration to save
the lives of those dying of leukemia and to relieve the suffering
of those with Parkinson's disease. Moreover, cloning will
enable infertile couples to have the baby they so desperately
want. IVF only works for 25% of patients (45). This leaves
millions of people unable to have children, often because
they cannot produce viable eggs and sperm, even with fertility
drugs. A blanket condemnation of cloning is unjustified.
Notes
Introduction
1. In Lee Silver, Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave
New World, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998, chapter 8
2. A mouse with a human ear springs to mind.
3. From Gregory Pence's Who's Afraid of Human Cloning?, Rowman
and Littlefield, (1998), chapter 1
4. Examples from Pence's Who's Afraid of Human Cloning? and
Gina Kolata's Clone: The Road to Dolly and the Path Ahead,
Penguin, 1997
5. From Pence Who's Afraid of Human Cloning
6. John Harris, "Goodbye Dolly: the ethics of human cloning",
in The Journal of Medical ethics (1997)
7. However I have briefly sketched out these issues in the
appendix as I feel that it is important to be aware of what
they are
What is Cloning?
8. From Silver's Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave
New World, chapter 8
9. The fact the lamb originated from an udder cell prompted
Wilmut to give her the name Dolly after Dolly Parton who he
joked was also known for her mammaries.
10. Cited in Harris, "Goodbye Dolly: the ethics of human cloning"
11. This is mentioned by Kolata in Clone: The Road to Dolly
and the Path Ahead
Misconceptions: Cloning, Identity and Immorality
12. This case is mentioned by Robin Harwood in "Hello Dolly,
goodbye death?", www.philosophers.co.uk/noframes/articles/dollynf
13. This is mentioned by Wilmut in an interview by Arlene
Judith Klotzko, "Voices from Roslin: The Creators of Dolly
Discuss Science, Ethics and Social Responsibility", in Cambridge
Quarterly of Health Care Ethics, 1998
14. Harry Harris, "Cloning can bring back my dead son", SundayTimes,
9 March 1997.
15. From Gould's "Dolly's Fashion and Louis's Passion", Natural
History, June 1997.
16. These cases are mentioned by Pence in Who's Afraid of
Human Cloning, chapter 2
17. John Harris, "Human Cloning and Human Dignity", in Cambridge
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 1998
18. George Johnson, "Don't Worry They Still Can't Clone a
Human Brain", New York Times, 2 March 1997
19. Ibid. In 1997 scientists discovered that how much a baby
is talked to and with how much affection dramatically effects
how many neural pathways are formed in its brain. This is
related to Johnson's point that the genes do not determine
the brain and given the general acceptance of mind-brain supervenience
the mind. See Sandra Blakesee's "Babies Brains are Dynamos
of Intellect" New York Times, 17 April 1997.
The Alleged Wisdom of Repugnance
20. Wilke is mentioned by Oliver Morton in "Overcoming Yuk",
www.wired.com/wired/6.01/morton
21. Pence, Who's Afraid of Human Cloning, chapter 1
22. This definition of sentimental morality is given by John
Harris in Cloning, Ethics and Immortality, Oxford University
Press, 1998, chapter 2
23. This comment is from Hume's A Treatise on Human Nature.
An extract of this is found in Singer's Ethics, Oxford University
Press, 1994, which is where I found the quote.
24. Norton, "Overcoming Yuk"
25. This example originates from Phillipa Foot's "Moral Beliefs"
26. See Phillipa Foot's essays "Moral Beliefs" in her book
Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Basil
Blackwell, 1978
Human Dignity
27. Cited in Harris, "Goodbye Dolly: the ethics of human cloning"
28. Cited in Ronald Bailey's "Send in the Clones", www.reason.com/9806/bk.bailey
29. This doctrine was proposed by in his Grounding for a Metaphysics
of Morals
30. Axel Kahn, "Clone Mammals…Clone Man?", Nature, 386
31. Cited in Singer's Practical Ethics, Cambridge University
Press, 1979, chapter 4
32. Mentioned in Harris, Clones, Genes and Immortality, chapter
2
33. Harris, "Human Cloning and Human Dignity"
34. R.C. Lewontin, "The Confusion over Cloning", www.nybooks.com.nyrev/WWWarchdisplay.cgi?1997102318R
35. Ibid.
36. Silver, Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New
World, chapter 8
37. Kevin T. Fitzgerald, "Human Cloning: Analysis and Evaluation",
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics,1998
38. Cited in Silver, Remarking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in
a Brave New World, chapter 8
39. John Harris mentions that the European Parliament believes
we have a right to a unique genetic identity and a right to
two parents in his essay, "Goodbye Dolly: the ethics of human
cloning".
40. Comment by Centre of Applied Ethics at the University
of Kent
41. Harris, "Goodbye Dolly: the ethics of human cloning"
42. Cited in Ruth F. Chadwick, "Cloning", Philosophy,1982
43. Comment from the Centre of Applied Ethics at the University
of Kent
Conclusion
44. John Locke, "Epistle to the Reader", in his Treatise on
the Human Understanding
45. Cited in Mark D. Eibert, "Human Cloning, Infertility,
and Reproductive Freedom", www.reason.com/opeds/eibert |
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